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Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union 
 





An EMU country that adheres to the Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact limits is 
implicitly promising not to allow its fiscal stance to deteriorate to a position in which it 
places pressure on the European Central Bank to forgo its price level target to finance fiscal 
deficits. Violation of these limits has raised questions about potential fiscal encroachment on 
the monetary authority’s freedom to determine the price level. We show that for the 
monetary authority to have the freedom to control price, the primary surplus must respond 
strongly enough to lagged debt. Panel estimates are consistent with monetary control of the 
price level. 
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1 Introduction
The joint responsibility of monetary and ￿scal policy for price stability poses a potential
problem for a monetary union. A single monetary authority and many ￿scal authorities all
have the potential to in￿ uence the price level. Recognizing possible con￿ icts of interest across
national governments, the founders of the European Monetary Union (EMU) drafted limits in
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to restrain ￿scal expansion,
by limiting de￿cits and debt relative to GDP. Their main objective was to eliminate ￿scal
in￿ uence on the price level, thereby assigning full responsibility for price stability to the
European Central Bank (ECB). However, these ￿scal limits have been violated by several
countries with no apparent ill e⁄ects, seemingly strengthening arguments that the limits are
unnecessary to minimize ￿scal in￿ uence on the price level. This leaves an open question
regarding the role of ￿scal policy in determining the price level in the EMU.
This paper addresses the question: Are EMU countries following ￿scal policies which
give the monetary authority the freedom to control the price level? This issue is normally
posed in the context of the ￿scal sustainability literature, in which satisfaction of a country￿ s
intertemporal budget constraint implies sustainability. This literature originally focused
on cointegration between real debt and real surpluses (Flavin and Hamilton 1986; Trehan
and Walsh 1991). However, Bohn (2007) demonstrates that cointegration is unnecessarily
restrictive for satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint and argues that a positive
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response of the primary surplus to debt is su¢ cient for the expected present value of debt to
be zero in the limit. Bohn (2008) and Mendoza and Ostry (2006) provide estimates of the
primary surplus response to debt to determine ￿scal sustainability. Bohn ￿nds a positive
coe¢ cient for the US, and hence sustainable ￿scal policy, while Mendoza and Ostry ￿nd
some emerging market countries have positive coe¢ cients, while others do not.
These criteria are related to requirements for ￿scal policy to be passive. The literature
on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) requires passive ￿scal policy as a necessary
condition for the monetary authority to have freedom to use active monetary policy to control
the price level. A passive ￿scal policy requires satisfaction of the government￿ s intertemporal
budget constraint for any sequence of prices and, hence, adjustment of the primary surplus
to debt. But since the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint holds in equilibrium
even when ￿scal policy is active, cointegration tests, based on the government￿ s budget
constraint, cannot distinguish between passive and active policies. VAR techniques, as in
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), which determine how debt responds to the surplus, are
plagued by the fact that at low frequencies they move together (Cochrane 1998). Without
an additional assumption on ￿scal policy, determination of whether ￿scal policy is passive or
active is plagued by serious identi￿cation problems. Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) add
the assumption that ￿scal policy follows a rule.1 Under this assumption, the response of the
primary surplus to lagged debt can be used to infer whether ￿scal policy is passive or active.
Given a ￿scal rule with time-invariant parameters, a positive coe¢ cient on lagged debt is
1 Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) assume two ￿scal rules with constant parameters and allow stochastic
switching over time between them.
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su¢ cient to assure that the present value of debt is always zero in the limit, irrespective of
the initial real value of debt implied by the initial price level. This is the criterion for passive
￿scal policy, and it is identical to Bohn￿ s criterion for sustainable ￿scal policy. However, if
the coe¢ cient on lagged debt is not positive, the FTPL interpretation di⁄ers from that in
the sustainability literature. The alternative to passive ￿scal policy is active ￿scal policy, not
unsustainable ￿scal policy. Under active ￿scal policy, the intertemporal budget constraint
holds only for a unique initial real value of debt and hence for a unique initial price level. The
assumption of a rule with time-invariant parameters is essential for this inference. Without
it, we could not reject the hypothesis of passive ￿scal policy because ￿scal policy could change
sometime in the future to assure intertemporal budget balance for any price level sequence,
a possibility that is unobservable to the econometrician today.2
The problem with assessing either the sustainability of ￿scal policy or its passivity with
the criterion of a positive primary surplus response to debt is that the government￿ s intertem-
poral budget constraint can be satis￿ed with debt growing boundlessly, as long as it grows
more slowly than the interest rate.3 Is it really possible for debt to reach the SGP limits and
keep growing? Is it possible for debt to reach double those limits and keep growing? triple?
As debt grows beyond its SGP limits, primary surpluses are required to increase to service
that debt. Since taxes are distortionary, there is a limit on the fraction of output that can
be raised in taxes. The limit implies an upper bound on debt. This paper departs from
the standard assumption that there are no upper bounds on debt and primary surpluses.
2 This is the implicit assumption for a non-positive coe¢ cient in the sustainability literature.
3 This can be expressed in terms of real surpluses, real debt and real interest rates, or in terms of surpluses
relative to output, debt relative to output and real growth-adjusted interest rates.
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Explicitly, we assume that at each point in time, there is an upper bound on the present-
value of future primary surpluses. Since debt is the expected present value of future primary
surpluses, there is an upper bound on debt.
We follow Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2007) and assume that ￿scal policy is governed by
a rule. This allows us to rule out unobservable and unveri￿able future policy changes which
keep debt from rising above its upper bound. We show that the assumption of the upper
bound on debt changes the focus of the analysis from the government￿ s intertemporal budget
constraint to dynamic stability of the system in government debt and the primary surplus.
Explosive paths for deviations of debt from its long-run equilibrium values must be ruled
out since these cannot be equilibria; global stability rules them out. Therefore, necessary
conditions for equilibrium require that initial debt be below its upper bound and that the
model in deviations be globally stable. This assures that deviations of debt from long-run
equilibrium are expected to vanish.
We derive restrictions on parameters in the ￿scal rule necessary for global stability. Not
only must the primary surplus respond positively to lagged debt, as Bohn (2008) showed
was necessary for sustainability and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) for passivity, but
the response must be large enough to rule out explosive debt. We refer to a ￿scal policy
with restrictions assuring global stability as "strongly passive." If ￿scal policy is not strongly
passive, then the economy could be shocked into a position from which debt is expected to
explode relative to its upper bound. Such a path cannot be an equilibrium. As in the FTPL,
this places pressure on the monetary authority to allow a price level jump such that the
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value of real debt jumps to a feasible path.4 Therefore, failure of ￿scal policy to be strongly
passive threatens the monetary authority￿ s control of the price level.
We estimate the parameters of the ￿scal rule with annual data on real debt, real primary
surpluses, and real GDP for a panel of ten EMU countries over the period 1970-2006. Our
estimation technique for the ￿scal rule di⁄ers from others in the literature by exploiting the
time series characteristics of the data, with cointegration and error correction techniques.
These variables are integrated of order one, and, in the presence of the upper bound, theory
says that they should be cointegrated.5 Therefore, the ￿scal rule can be expressed as an error
correction model, and the objective of the empirical work is estimation of its parameters.
Another advantage of our approach is that we estimate the parameters using panel data,
allowing heterogeneity across countries in both the cointegrating parameters and in the
loadings on the error correction terms. Panel data techniques are increasingly used to test
macroeconomic hypotheses like purchasing power parity and output convergence. Panels
have greater power than the usual time series tests because they combine information from
both the cross-section and the time dimension.
We ￿nd that over the sample period, ￿scal policy has been su¢ ciently responsive to
increases in debt in our panel of ten EMU countries to imply that it is strongly passive. This
provides evidence that violation of the limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP have
not been serious enough to threaten the ability of the ECB to control the price level.
4 As Leeper (1991) demonstrated, there is no equilibrium if both monetary and ￿scal policy are active.
Therefore, if ￿scal policy is active, there is pressure on the monetary authority to become passive and vice
versa.
5 In the absence of an upper bound, the intertemporal budget constraint is satis￿ed with debt growing
boundlessly, as long as it grows more slowly than its interest rate. However, such an equilibrium does not
necessarily imply cointegration. See Bohn (2007).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the behavior of monetary and
￿scal policy in a monetary union and derives the restrictions on the parameters of the ￿scal
rule necessary for a strongly passive policy. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis, and
Section 4 provides conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that countries in the monetary union are small enough that they cannot a⁄ect
the world price level or world interest rate. There is a single good in the world, implying
that equilibrium in goods markets requires the law of one price. Normalizing the world price
level at unity and assuming no world in￿ ation implies that, in equilibrium, the price level in
the monetary union is the exchange rate.
We assume that international creditors are willing to buy and sell government bonds in the
monetary union as long as the interest rate on these bonds (rt) satis￿es interest rate parity.
Interest rate parity can be derived using Euler equations for a representative world agent
when the covariance of the monetary union interest rate with the world agent consumption
is zero, or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumption that the














where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information and Pt denotes the price
level, and equivalently the exchange rate, in the monetary union.
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The monetary authority can control expected in￿ ation because it can control the nominal
interest rate (rt). Interest rate parity implies that the monetary authority￿ s choice of the
nominal interest rate determines expected in￿ ation.6 Leeper (1991) demonstrated that in
order for the monetary authority to also be able control the price level and not just its rate
of change, ￿scal policy must be passive. We show below that in the presence of the upper
bound, ￿scal policy must be strongly passive.
2.2 Fiscal Policy
2.2.1 Government Flow Budget Constraint
Consider the ￿ ow government budget constraint for the ith country in a monetary union.
Letting Git, Tit, B
p
it and Mit denote, respectively, nominal government spending, tax revenue,
publicly held government bonds, and the money supply backed by the ith country￿ s bonds
at time t, the ith government￿ s nominal ￿ ow budget constraint is given by
B
p
it + Mit = (1 + rt￿1)B
p
it￿1 + Mit￿1 + Git ￿ Tit:
























1+rtMit is seigniorage revenues returned to the ith country by the monetary authority.
The government￿ s real ￿ ow budget constraint can be expressed as
bit = (1 + rt￿1)
Pt￿1
Pt
bit￿1 ￿ sit: (2)
6 Daniel (2007) demonstrates that monetary policy retains control of expected in￿ ation even under passive
monetary policy and active ￿scal policy, as in the FTPL.
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(1 + rt￿1)bit￿1; (3)
such that ￿it > 0 denotes positive in￿ ation, which reduces the real value of outstanding debt,
the equation for the evolution of real debt can be expressed as
bit = (1 + r)bit￿1 ￿ sit ￿ (￿it ￿ Et￿1￿it): (4)
where (￿it ￿ Et￿1￿it) represents unanticipated in￿ ation or, equivalently, a price level shock.
Unanticipated in￿ ation acts like a tax, which raises revenue and lowers the value of real debt.
Additionally, this equation reveals that real debt accumulates in response to expectations of
in￿ ation, which are not realized. Expectations of in￿ ation raise the interest rate, and when
the in￿ ation does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest rate.
We assume that there is an upper bound on taxes that can be raised to service debt and




to be expressed as a linear function of output according to
r￿ bit = ￿ ki + ￿ ’iyit; (5)
where yit is real GDP, and ￿ ’i and ￿ ki are country-speci￿c parameters. We motivate this
assumption with the realization that governments face limits on their ability to raise taxes,
which in turn implies an upper bound on the value of debt that can be serviced.
In what follows we determine the restrictions on ￿scal policy necessary to assure that debt
remains below its upper bound and test whether these restrictions are empirically satis￿ed.
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2.2.2 Fiscal Policy Rule
We assume that the ￿scal authority is able to commit to a rule for the primary surplus. We






and debt service (rbit￿1). The ￿scal rule for the ith country is given by
sit = ￿0i + ￿1isit￿1 + ￿2is
￿
it￿1 + ￿3irbit￿1 + ￿it; (6)
where ￿it is a stochastic disturbance representing ￿scal shocks. Fiscal shocks re￿ ect both
politically-determined shocks to taxes or government spending, and responses, perhaps coun-
tercyclical or optimal tax, of the ￿scal authority to the fundamental shocks that a⁄ect the
economy. Most recently, they re￿ ect the ￿scal response to the global ￿nancial crisis of 2007-
2009. The lagged value of the primary surplus allows persistence and re￿ ects the desire to
smooth the e⁄ect of shocks over time. The commitment to honor debt for any sequence of
shocks, which each country makes to enter the monetary union, implies that the primary
surplus should respond positively to lagged debt.
It is necessary to make some assumptions about the behavior of the target surplus in an
economy with growing income. We assume that the target surplus is linear in real GDP, and
test the assumption in the empirical implementation. The target surplus is given by
s
￿
it = ki + ’iyit; (7)
where ki ￿ ￿ ki and ’i ￿ ￿ ’i represent country-speci￿c parameters. Substituting for the target
surplus in equation (6) yields a ￿scal rule in which the surplus responds to the lagged surplus,
lagged output, lagged debt, and is subject to a stochastic shock.
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2.3 Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 Given constant values for the world interest rate and price level, a time series
process for each yit, a ￿scal rule for each of the i countries (equation 6), and an upper bound
on each country￿ s debt (equation 5), an equilibrium is a set of time series processes for the
monetary union price level, represented by ￿it; and a set of time series processes for each
country￿ s primary surplus and debt, sit and bit; such that each government￿ s ￿ow budget
constraint (equation 4) holds, the debt for each country is not expected to exceed its upper
bound, expectations are rational, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets
determined by interest rate parity (equation 1).
Explosive debt relative to output is not consistent with equilibrium when there is an
upper bound. Therefore, equilibrium requires existence of a stationary long-run equilibrium
in which debt relative to output is not changing systematically. This in turn requires re-
strictions on the parameters of the ￿scal rule to assure the existence of a stationary long-run
equilibrium.
Restrictions su¢ cient to assure a stationary long-run equilibrium are not su¢ cient to
assure that the monetary authority can follow active monetary policy and control the price
level. The long-run equilibrium could be achieved with price level jumps (￿t ￿ Et￿1￿t) as in
the FTPL. To rule out price-level jumps, the system must be expected to reach its stationary
long-run equilibrium in their absence. This requires that the model be globally stable instead
of saddlepath stable. We derive additional restrictions on the ￿scal rule to assure global
stability and test for these.
2.3.1 Long-run Equilibrium
Given that each of the three variables, real primary surplus, real debt, and real output
appear integrated of order one, the stationary long-run equilibrium can be characterized by
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cointegrating relationships. We test for I(1) behavior of the variables and use cointegration
techniques to estimate the parameters of the cointegrating vectors representing the long-
run equilibrium relationships. The use of cointegration to estimate the parameters of the
relationship between debt and the primary surplus follows earlier work on ￿scal sustainability
(Hamilton and Flavin 1986; Trehan and Walsh 1991).
To complete the model, we need a stochastic process for output. The stochastic represen-
tations of the long-run equilibrium relationships di⁄er depending on whether we allow output
growth to be represented by an exponential or a linear process. For empirically reasonable
growth rates, the two representations for output are virtually identical over our sample of
only thirty-seven years.7 Additionally, a linear representation allows us to exploit the time
series characteristics of the data using cointegration to obtain super-consistent estimates of
the long-run cointegrating parameters. The more typical exponential representation, nec-
essary for longer time series, requires representation of the model either in as fractions of
output or as logarithms. We cannot use logarithms of the debt and primary surplus since
they are unde￿ned when the values are negative. With representation as fractions of output,
we lose the I(1) properties of the data that we are trying to exploit. The linear representa-
tion of growth should be viewed as an approximation for the geometric representation, and
is reasonable when the sample is not too long.
We assume that real GDP in levels is integrated of order one, consistent with our empirical
7 Adjusted R2 coe¢ cients for linear and exponential growth models di⁄er only in the third decimal place for
most countries, and the adjusted R2 coe¢ cient is actually higher with linear growth for Italy. Both Ireland
and Greece experienced an increase in growth rates over the sample, and neither model with constant growth
￿ts very well. Exponential growth does ￿t signi￿cantly better than linear growth for these two countries.
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evidence presented below. Additionally, we assume that output does not respond to the
primary surplus or to debt,8 yielding a stochastic process for GDP as
yit = yit￿1 + ￿i (yit￿1 ￿ yit￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿i)gi + ￿it; (8)
where ￿i re￿ ects autocorrelation in growth, gi is the equilibrium linear growth rate, and ￿it
is a well-behaved output shock.
With this assumption, the long-run equilibrium relationships are characterized by coin-
tegrating relationships and can be expressed as




where the ￿rst requires deviations of the primary surplus from its target to be stationary,
and the second requires the deviations of the primary surplus from debt service, adjusted
for growth, to be stationary. When equation (9) holds, the primary surplus is expected to
change by ’igi; and debt is expected to change by
’igi
r .9 Since output is expected to change
by gi, variables are expected to retain the relationship given by equation (9).10 Given the
assumptions in equation (5), the stationary long-run equilibrium value for debt satis￿es the
upper bound restrictions.
Lemma 1 The long-run equilibrium relationships, characterized by equations (9), hold if





and ￿1i + ￿2i + ￿3i = 1
8 This assumption holds in many models with Ricardian Equivalence and in many others there is only a short-
run response, which would a⁄ect the dynamic behavior of the residuals, but not the long-run characteristics.
9 To show this, substitute the second long-run cointegrating expression for the primary surplus into equation
(4) and solve for the change in debt, (bit ￿ bit￿1). In a stationary long-run equilibrium, the change in the
primary surplus (sit ￿ sit￿1) equals the change in debt service r(bit ￿ bit￿1).
10Under exponential output growth, with yit = (1 + git)yit￿1, the cointegrating relationships would have
the same form, but the coe¢ cients would have a di⁄erent interpretation. Speci￿cally, the cointegrating
relationships would be sit = ’iyit =
r￿gi
1+gibit. The constants in the cointegrating relationships would be zero
and the coe¢ cient on debt would have the interpretation of the real growth-adjusted interest rate, instead
of the real interest rate.
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Proof. Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields
sit = ￿0i + ￿1isit￿1 + ￿2i(ki + ’iyit￿1) + ￿3irbit￿1 + ￿it:
If the long-run equilibrium conditions hold, then sit￿1 = ki+’iyit￿1, rbit￿1 = sit￿1+
’igi(1+r)
r
and the primary surplus is expected to change by ’igi, such that sit = sit￿1 + ’igi. Substi-
tuting these long-run conditions and the mean value for ￿it of zero into the equation above
yields
sit￿1 + ’igi = ￿0i + ￿3i
￿
’igi (1 + r)
r
￿
+ ￿1isit￿1 + ￿2isit￿1 + ￿3isit￿1:
Equating coe¢ cients on sit￿1 and the constant to zero, yields the relationships above.
These restrictions allow the ￿scal rule to be expressed as an error correction model in
which the change in the primary surplus responds to two error correction terms. Substituting
the parameter restrictions from Lemma 1 into equation (6), and rearranging yields
sit￿sit￿1 = ’igi￿￿3i
￿
sit￿1 ￿ rbit￿1 +
’igi (1 + ri)
r
￿
￿￿2i (sit￿1 ￿ ’iyit￿1 ￿ ki)+￿it: (10)
Substituting equation (10) into the government￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint, given by equa-
tion (4), yields
bit ￿ bit￿1 =
’igi
r
￿ (1 ￿ ￿3i)
￿
sit￿1 ￿ rbit￿1 +
’igi (1 + ri)
r
￿
+ ￿2i (sit￿1 ￿ ’iyit￿1 ￿ ki)
￿￿it ￿ (￿it ￿ Et￿1￿it) (11)
Equations (8), (10), and (11) are the dynamic equations of the model, written to reveal
the nature of a stationary long-run equilibrium. In a stationary long-run equilibrium, the
primary surplus equals its target and pays less than the interest rate on debt, allowing debt
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service to grow with output. Deviations from the cointegrating relations are due to shocks
and are stationary. The shocks to the primary surplus can be transitory or permanent. A
positive ￿scal shock created by a permanent change in output will be largely permanent in
contrast to a ￿scal shock created by a temporary reduction in government spending, which
must vanish since it reduces the primary surplus relative to output.
2.3.2 Stability
We assess stability under the parameter restrictions necessary for existence of a long-run
equilibrium. The time paths for each country￿ s surplus and debt can be determined by
solving equations (8), (10), and (11). Denoting deviations of the primary surplus from its
equilibrium values, given by output and debt service, and deviations of output growth from
its equilibrium value, respectively, as
Yit = sit ￿ ’iyit ￿ ki
Bit = sit ￿ rbit +
’igi (1 + r)
r
;
￿it = yit ￿ yit￿1 ￿ gi = ￿yit ￿ gi
equations (8), (10), and (11) can be rearranged as
Yit = (1 ￿ ￿2i)Yit￿1 ￿ ￿3iBit￿1 ￿ ’i￿i￿it￿1 ￿ ’i￿it + ￿it (12)
Bit = ￿(1 + r)￿2iYit￿1 + (1 + r)(1 ￿ ￿3i)Bit￿1 + r(￿it ￿ Et￿1￿it) + (1 + r)￿it (13)
￿it = ￿i￿it￿1 + ￿it (14)
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Trivially, a stationary long-run equilibrium requires that limt!1 Yit = limt!1 Bit =
limt!1 ￿it = 0: We have assumed the existence of such an equilibrium in which debt satis￿es
its upper bound restrictions. The system reaches the stationary long-run equilibrium if it is
either globally stable or saddlepath stable.
Stability properties are determined by the roots of the dynamic system, given by equations
(12), (13) and (14). Letting ￿i represent the roots of the dynamic system, the characteristic
equation for country i is given by
(￿i ￿ ￿i)
￿





where ￿2i = 1 ￿ ￿1i ￿ ￿3i; as required for existence of a stationary long-run equilibrium.
We assume that the roots of the characteristic equation for each country are real and
distinct. The ￿i are empirically less than one11. If the remaining roots of the characteristic
equation for the ith country are within the unit circle, then the economic system for the
ith country is globally stable. If the system is globally stable for each country, then each
country is expected to reach the stationary long-run equilibrium, characterized by equation
(9), for any initial values of the variables and any shocks it receives, where shocks include
the ￿scal shock (￿it) and the output shock (￿it). This leaves the monetary authority free
to choose the price level in equilibrium, which given the assumed price-level target, implies
￿it = Et￿1￿it = 0 for each country. Therefore, global stability is necessary to give the
monetary authority freedom to control the price level in equilibrium.
Alternatively, if one of the roots of the characteristic equation for one country is outside
11The group mean estimate of ￿ is 0.35.
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of the unit circle, then the economic system is only saddlepath stable. If the system is
only saddlepath stable, then it can reach the stationary long-run equilibrium only along the
saddlepath. There must be a jumping variable to o⁄set shocks which move the system away
from the saddlepath, equivalently to set the coe¢ cient on the unstable root to zero. The only
candidate is the real value of debt through a price level surprise (￿it ￿ Et￿1￿it): Therefore,
if a saddlepath stable system is to attain an equilibrium, then the monetary authority is not
free to choose the price level.
Equation (15) can be used to show that global stability for country i requires that
￿3i > 1 ￿ ￿1i and ￿ 1 < (1 + r)￿1i < 1: (16)
Satisfaction of the inequalities in equation (16) assures that all roots are within the unit
circle and we refer to a ￿scal policy with these restrictions as strongly passive. The criterion
explored by other authors for ￿scal policy to be sustainable or passive is simply a positive
response of primary surplus to debt, ￿3i > 0. This criterion assures intertemporal budget
balance in the absence of upper bounds, but it does not prevent explosive behavior of debt
relative to output. Our criteria require a relatively strong response of primary surplus to
debt, not just a positive response. Strongly passive ￿scal policy restricts debt to grow slowly
than output in the limit. By requiring debt relative to output to reach a stationary long-run
equilibrium value, strongly passive ￿scal policy also assures intertemporal budget balance.
If all countries have strongly passive ￿scal policy, our inference is that the monetary
authority can control the union price level. Dupor￿ s (2000) work could be used to argue that
only the aggregate ￿scal stance matters, not each country￿ s individual stance. However, if
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one country￿ s debt embarks upon an explosive path and union debt does not, then there
is some member country whose debt in on an implosive path, as it taxes its citizens and
transfers resources to the other country. Given the reasonable assumption that governments
choose ￿scal policy to maximize the welfare of their own citizens, no country would choose
such a policy.12 Therefore, the relevant criterion for monetary policy freedom is strongly
passive ￿scal policy for each country, not for the set of aggregated countries.
In summary, consideration of upper bounds implies that a necessary condition for the
monetary authority to be able to choose the price level is that the response of the primary
surplus to debt is strong enough in each country that equation (16) holds for all i countries.
This restriction assures that the system of equations containing the debt and primary surplus
for each country is globally stable. We refer to a ￿scal rule which yields global stability as
strongly passive ￿scal policy.13
It is important to recognize that the assumption that ￿scal policy commits to a rule
with time-invariant parameters is an assumption. Even if we found that the response of the
primary surplus to lagged debt was too small for both roots to be within the unit circle,
the monetary authority could still control the price level if the government was expected to
adjust the primary surplus in the future in some way that di⁄ers from the current estimated
rule. However, promises of future changes to resolve current insolvency might not be credible.
12Sims (1997) and Daniel (2001) make this argument. Additionally, there is an explicit covenant in the EMU
agreements whereby member countries are not responsible for the debts of others.
13Of course, global stability cannot assure that extremely large negative surplus shocks do not yield a
violation of the upper bound. Therefore, strongly passive ￿scal policy is not su¢ cient to rule out all risk
that the monetary authority would lose control of the price level. But strongly passive ￿scal policy is
necessary to assure that the monetary authority is expected to retain control of the price level. See Daniel
and Shiamptanis (2009).
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The justi￿cation for committing to a rule is that it enhances transparency and credibility of
policy and avoids problems of dynamic inconsistency.
3 Empirical Results
The purpose of the empirical work is to test whether the restrictions on ￿scal policy necessary
for the monetary authority to have control of the price level hold in the EMU countries. These
restrictions include 1) the existence of cointegrating relationships between the primary sur-
plus and debt, and between the primary surplus and output; and 2) a strong enough response
of the surplus to debt to yield global stability for the dynamic system. Additionally, esti-
mation of the parameters of ￿scal policy provides parameter values which other researchers
can use to calibrate ￿scal policy. We have annual data on the real primary surplus, sit, real
debt, bit, and real GDP, yit, for the period 1970-2006 for a panel of ten EMU countries.14
First, we establish that the variables behave as unit root processes, I (1). We use panel
unit root tests which have more power than the time series unit root tests. Following Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003), we test the null hypothesis that all series in the panel contain a
unit root, against the alternative hypothesis that some of the series in the heterogeneous
panel are stationary. The test is based on the average of N individual augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1979) (ADF) t-statistics. The tests include an individual speci￿c constant and trend.
They are computed alternately using one lag, two lags, and heterogeneous numbers of lags
across countries, with the lag order estimated using consistent information criteria such as
14The countries were chosen based on data availability. They include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. For more details see the Data Appendix.
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the Akaike and Schwarz criteria. Table 1 reports the results with one lag. All the tests fail
to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in sit, bit; and yit at the 5 percent level, implying
that the variables sit, bit and yit are I (1).15
Given that the variables in the ￿scal rule appear to behave as unit root processes, we
test for the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships, equations (9), using cointegration
techniques. Since the time dimension of our sample is not long enough to allow estimation
of cointegrating relationships for each country, we use panel cointegration techniques. We
estimate the following cointegrating model
sit = ai + %ixit + eit (17)
and test for the existence of cointegrating relationships between the real primary surplus
and real debt, and between the real primary surplus and real GDP. In equation (17), ai
denotes the country speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, sit is the real primary surplus, xit is the regressor,
bit or yit, and %i is the cointegrating parameter, ri or ’i. In the panel, we allow the long-
run cointegrating parameters to di⁄er across countries. Even though theory implies that
the real interest rates should be identical across countries, we allow them to vary due to
possible di⁄erences in the de￿nitions of debt or the primary surplus across countries. We
model heterogeneity across countries by allowing each country￿ s policy parameters to di⁄er
randomly from the EMU panel policy parameters. Letting ￿i be the ith country￿ s vector of
15We also fail to reject the null of a unit root when we use Breitung (2000), Maddala and Wu (1999),
Choi (2001) tests, and we reject the null of no unit root when we use Hadri (2000) test. Additionally, we
con￿rm the unit root behavior of the series using panel unit root tests suggested by Breitung and Das (2005),
Moon and Perron (2004) and Pesaran (2006), which account for various forms of cross-sectional dependence.
The tests are computed using one lag and two lags. For Moon and Perron￿ s (2004) procedure we use one
unobserved factor. All tests include an individual speci￿c constant and trend.
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policy parameters, and ￿ the vector of EMU policy parameters, we assume that ￿i = ￿ +￿￿i,
where the ￿￿i have zero-means and constant variances for all i.
We begin with two group-mean panel cointegration t tests suggested by Pedroni (1999,
2004).16 Both tests are residual-based cointegration tests, which test the null hypothesis
that the variables of interest are not cointegrated for all the countries in the panel against
the alternative hypothesis that there exists a heterogeneous cointegration vector for all the
countries in the panel. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the residuals, ^ eit, are
I (1). Denoting the autoregressive coe¢ cient of the ith country￿ s residuals by ￿i, the group-
mean statistics test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, Ho : ￿i = 1 for all i, versus the
heterogeneous alternative hypothesis, HA : ￿i < 1 for all i. The alternative does not presume
a common value for ￿i = ￿. The ￿rst group-mean test uses semi-parametric corrections, while
the second is a parametric ADF test.17 The tests are extensions of the single time series
Phillips-Perron (1988) t-test and the ADF t-test. We account for cross-sectional dependence
and cross-member cointegration by using common time e⁄ects.18 For the semi-parametric
16The group-mean statistics allow modeling an additional source of potential heterogeneity across individual
members of the panel. Moreover, Gutierrez (2003) ￿nds that Pedroni￿ s tests have higher power than the
system test proposed by Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001). Additionally, Banarjee, Marcellino and
Osbat (2004) show that for small N the size distortions of Pedroni￿ s tests are lower than those of Larsson
and Lyhagen (1999) test.
17The speci￿cations are given in the Appendix.
18Common time e⁄ects allow us to model a limited form of cross-sectional dependence and cross-member
cointegration (which is a form of long-run cross-sectional dependence). Common time e⁄ects assume that the
cross-sectional dependence correlation between country i and j is identical for all i;j. Thus, in the presence
of heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence, subtracting o⁄ the cross-sectional average does not completely
eliminate cross-sectional dependence. The method by which cross-sectional dependence is modeled in panels
is still an active area of research. Bai and Ng (2002) and Moon and Perron (2004) consider models in which
the error terms have a factor structure in panel unit root tests, however the implications for such factor
models have not been studied in the panel cointegration context. Notice though that time e⁄ects are a
special case of a factor model where there is a single common factor and the response of each country is
similar. Therefore, time e⁄ects account for both cross-sectional dependence and cross-member cointegration
when the source of dependency is due to a single common time speci￿c shock.
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test we use the Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West bandwidth selection procedure, and for
the parametric ADF-type test, we use the step-down procedure to estimate the number of
lags. The results, reported in Table 2, indicate that both tests reject the null hypothesis of
no cointegration at the 5 percent level.19 Therefore, Pedroni￿ s tests provide strong evidence
that sit and bit are cointegrated and that sit and yit are also cointegrated.
We con￿rm that there are two cointegrating relations in the trivariate model using the sys-
tem panel cointegration test proposed by Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001). Their test
is a panel version of Johansen￿ s (1988, 1995) full information maximum likelihood method.
The null hypothesis is that all of the N countries in the panel have at most q cointegrating
relationships among the 3 variables, Ho : q cointegrating relations for all i; and the alter-
native is that all the countries have 3, HA : 3 cointegrating relations for all i: This is a
sequential procedure where ￿rst q = 0 is tested. If this hypothesis is rejected, q = 1 is tested.
The sequential procedure continues until the null is not rejected or the hypothesis q = 2
is rejected. The test is computed using one-lag di⁄erence terms and it includes individual
speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. In Table 3 we verify that there are two cointegrating relations in the
model. The panel test statistic indicates that q = 2 in the model with three variables sit,
bit and yit. This implies that there is a single stochastic trend in the data, implying that
there are cointegrating relations between sit and bit; and between sit and yit; consistent with
previous results.
We conclude that the data satisfy restrictions necessary for existence of a stationary long-
19We also reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we use all seven panel statistics of
Pedroni (1999, 2004). Additionally, we reject the null of no cointegration at the 5 percent level when we do
not use the common time e⁄ects.
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run equilibrium relationship between the primary surplus and debt, and between the primary
surplus and output. Therefore, the ￿rst set of restrictions, necessary for the monetary
authority to have control of the price level, is satis￿ed. The second set of restrictions are
those requiring global stability of the model, equations (16). To determine whether these are
satis￿ed, we estimate the parameters of the error correction model, equation (10). To do so,
we use a two-step procedure, in which we initially estimate the cointegrating parameters. In
the second step, we estimate the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms.
To estimate the cointegrating parameters, we use Pedroni￿ s (2000, 2001) group-mean
fully modi￿ed OLS (FMOLS) procedure for cointegrated panels, which is based on equation
(17).20 The group-mean FMOLS procedure accommodates the heterogeneity that is typically
present both in the transitional serial correlation dynamics and in the long-run cointegrating
relationships. It is a semi-parametric approach that adjusts for the e⁄ects of endogenous
regressors and short-run dynamics of the errors.21 We use the Bartlett kernel and the Newey-
West bandwidth selection procedure as suggested by Pedroni (2000). The results, in Table
4, indicate that the group-mean panel estimate for the real interest rate is 4.22 percent
(r = 0:0422) and the group-mean panel estimate for the target primary surplus is 3.80 percent
20Bohn (2008) considers a similar equation with xit given by debt, using over two centuries of US data on the
primary surplus, output, and debt. His real data series have severe heteroskedasticiy, due to two centuries of
growth in real GDP. He reduces, but does not eliminate, these problems by dividing by real GDP. Standard
deviations for real variables are 64 to 98 times as high in the second period as in the ￿rst. For variables
expressed as a fraction of GDP, this number falls to something a little larger than 2. We have a very di⁄erent
data set from Bohn￿ s ￿a relatively short time dimension and ten countries. The shorter time dimension
implies that we do not have Bohn￿ s heteroskedasticity problem. Ratios of standard deviations in the second
half of the sample relative to the ￿rst half average to something less than 2, similar to his adjusted data.
21Since FMOLS is designed to reduce bias associated with short-run dynamics and the estimates in the I (1)
model are super-consistent, it is not necessary to add stationary variables, like HP-￿ltered measures of the
data, as in Bohn￿ s model with stationary data (2008) .
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of GDP (’ = 0:0380).22
In the ￿nal step we consider estimation of the group-mean panel ￿scal policy parame-
ters ￿1; ￿2; and ￿3; subject to the restrictions in Lemma 1, yielding the error-correction
speci￿cation, equation (10). It is important to recognize that the residuals in equation (10)
could be autocorrelated in the data. If so, then the residuals could be correlated with the
right-hand-side variables, biasing estimates of the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms.
Therefore, we use Sims￿(1980) likelihood ratio test to determine the appropriate number of
lags to fully capture the dynamics for each country. For some countries, the test chooses
a single lag in levels, implying that equation (10) is appropriately speci￿ed. However, for
others, two lags are chosen. Therefore, to be sure that we are not omitting relevant lags and
thereby biasing estimates of coe¢ cients, we estimate the model with an additional lag, such
that the error correction speci￿cation becomes23
sit ￿ sit￿1 = ’igi ￿ ￿3i
￿
sit￿1 ￿ ribit￿1 +
’igi (1 + ri)
ri
￿
￿ ￿2i (sit￿1 ￿ ’iyit￿1 ￿ ki) + (18)
￿1i (sit￿1 ￿ sit￿2 ￿ ’igi) + ￿2i
￿




+ ￿3i (yit￿1 ￿ yit￿2 ￿ gi) + ￿it:
A persistent, but negative surplus shock, perhaps created by a war, would imply a negative
error in the ￿rst cointegrating relationship and rising lagged debt, implying a negative corre-
lation between the two terms. Therefore, failure to include the lagged change in debt could
22The FMOLS results are robust to the choice of kernel and bandwidth. We obtain almost identical estimates
when we use the Parzen and quadratic spectral (QS) kernels and the Andrews (1991) bandwidth selection
procedure. Additionally, we obtain similar estimates when we use the group mean dynamic OLS (DOLS)
procedure of Pedroni (2004) and the two-step estimator of Breitung (2005).
23The additional dynamics modify slightly the conditions under which ￿3i > 1 ￿ ￿1i is necessary to assure
global stability, that is for all roots to be within the unit circle. For ￿1i = 0; as is veri￿ed empirically, we
need ￿1 < ￿1i (1 + r) + ￿2i < 1; which also holds empirically.
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bias the estimate on the coe¢ cient on the error correction terms.24
Now, consider estimation of the coe¢ cients on the error correction terms in equation
(18). First, we use the estimated cointegrating parameters of the interest rate and target
surplus to construct the error correction terms for each country (ri, ’i), yielding an equation
in which all the variables are stationary. Asymptotically, the fact that we use the estimated
error correction terms rather than the true error correction terms in (18) does not a⁄ect the
standard properties of our estimates due to the super-consistency properties of the estima-
tor of the cointegrating relationships.25 After constructing the error correction terms, we
estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction model, augmented with lagged changes in
variables, providing estimates for ￿2 and ￿3. Under the restrictions in Lemma 1, this also
gives an estimate of ￿1. We use the group-mean procedure recommended by Pesaran and
Smith (1995).26
Table 5 indicates that ￿1 = 0:4882, ￿2 = ￿0:1214 and ￿3 = 0:6332, where ￿3 is statis-
tically signi￿cantly larger than 1 ￿ ￿1.27 Using our terminology, we cannot reject the null
that ￿scal policy in each country is strongly passive. Therefore, ￿scal policy in the EMU
24Using long US samples of one and two centuries that highlight the role of wars, Bohn (1998, 2008) expresses
the ￿scal rule in terms of the surplus and debt as a fraction of output, and ￿nds it necessary to add HP-￿lter
measures of transitory values of the variables to distinguish between the response of the surplus to permanent
and transitory shocks and reduce "omitted variables bias." Transitory, but persistent government spending,
as associated with a war, would be accompanied by rising debt implying that the residual would be low when
debt is high relative to the surplus. The error correction model deals with this by adding lagged changes of
the model variables. In this example the lagged change in debt would be high in a war and would play the
role of Bohn￿ s transitory military spending, and the lagged change in output would play the role of Bohn￿ s
HP-￿ltered output.
25See Engle and Granger (1987), Toda and Phillips (1993) and Urbain (1992) for the properties of estimators
in cointegrated systems.
26They show that when the parameters of interest are heterogeneous, the group-mean procedure provides
consistent estimates, whereas the pool panel procedures give inconsistent estimates.
27We obtain almost identical estimates when we use the hierarchical Bayes estimator of Hsiao, Pesaran
and Tahmiscioglu (1999) and the weighted estimator of Swamy (1980) (also referred as the empirical Bayes
estimator). We also ￿nd that each country￿ s ￿3i is larger than 1 ￿ ￿1i, not only the panel estimates.
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countries satis￿es the second set of restrictions for monetary policy to have the ability to
determine the price level, those of global stability. We note also, that our tests imply ￿scal
sustainability and passive ￿scal policy, according to earlier de￿nitions, since the criteria for
both is a positive value for ￿3:
At ￿rst glance the estimated coe¢ cient on target surplus, ￿2, might seem that it has the
wrong sign. However, target variables should always be viewed as reference points relative
to another variable. The ￿scal rule in equation (10) can also be written as













which implies that the primary surplus increases whenever the target surplus is above the
current value and whenever the debt service is above the target value. Restrictions for
strongly passive ￿scal policy, ￿3i > 1￿￿1i, together with the long-run equilibrium restriction,
￿1i + ￿2i + ￿3i = 1, imply that ￿2i < 0:
We have not allowed estimates of the parameters of the error correction model to change
as the monetary union has evolved over time. However, if the coe¢ cients in the cointegrating
relationships had changed and no account were taken for the change, then we should not have
rejected the null of no cointegration. The values for the coe¢ cients on the error correction
terms could have changed. To test for a change in ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3, we break the sample
into two sub-periods, the pre-Maastricht era (1970 ￿ 1993) and the post-Maastricht era
(1994 ￿ 2006).28 Table 6 shows that ￿3 > 1 ￿ ￿1 in both sub-samples, although standard
errors are too high to yield signi￿cance.29 The split sample evidence suggest that the primary
28The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on November 1, 1993.
29
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surplus is su¢ ciently responsive to debt to give the monetary authority control of the price
level in both sub-samples.30
4 Conclusion
A country entering the EMU surrenders its monetary policy and its debt becomes denom-
inated in terms of a currency over which it has no direct control. A country￿ s promise to
uphold the limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP is implicitly a promise not to allow
its ￿scal policy to threaten the ability of the ECB to control the price level. However, many
countries have violated these limits. This leaves an open question regarding the role of ￿scal
policy in determining the price level in the EMU.
We assume that there is an upper bound on debt, motivated by an upper bound on
distortionary taxes which a government can raise to service the debt. Fiscal policy is assumed
to follow a ￿scal rule with time-invariant parameters. For the ECB to have power to control
the price level in the EMU, the ￿scal rule must imply that debt is not expected to explode
relative to its upper bound. We show that this requires that the dynamic model of the
primary surplus and debt be globally stable. This in turn requires that the primary surplus
responds to an increase in debt by at least one minus the persistence in primary surplus.
We call such a policy "strongly passive" since the criterion is stronger than those requiring
intertemporal budget balance, as with passive policy. We show that a strongly passive ￿scal
The sub-samples are not long enough to allow reliable inference. Most of our panel techniques require the
time series dimension to be substantially larger than the cross-section dimension, and we lose this when we
split the sample.
30Afonso (2005) and Annett (2006), who use a similar EMU data set and other empirical techniques, do not
￿nd evidence for a change in the ￿scal policy after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.
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policy yields a model which is globally stable, such that initial deviations of the primary
surplus from its target and from debt service are expected to vanish in the long run. This
gives the monetary authority the freedom to determine price in equilibrium. Additionally,
global stability assures intertemporal budget balance, but the converse does not hold.
This paper provides estimates of a rule for the primary surplus to determine whether ￿scal
policy in the EMU countries is strongly passive. Using panel cointegration and panel data
techniques that allow for heterogeneity, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction
model for the primary surplus in a panel of ten EMU countries over the period 1970-2006.
The group-mean estimate for the coe¢ cient on lagged debt is consistent with the hypothesis
that ￿scal policy in EMU countries is strongly passive, giving the monetary authority control
over the price level.
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Appendix
A Data Appendix
Nominal primary surplus, nominal GDP and GDP de￿ ator are from the OECD database.
The nominal debt is also from OECD database and for missing years data is obtained from the
ECB￿ s AMECO database. The sample consists of annual data from 1970-2006 for Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. For
Luxembourg and Portugal there was not data available for a lot of years. For Germany we
use the data for West Germany before uni￿cation and Germany after uni￿cation. The real
values of the variables for each country are obtained by dividing the nominal values by the
GDP de￿ ator.
For the nominal primary surplus we use the general government primary balances (OECD
Annex Table 29) and for nominal debt we use the general government gross ￿nancial liabilities
(OECD Annex Table 33).
B Panel Cointegration Statistics (Pedroni (1999))
1. Group mean t ￿ statistic (semi-parametric):
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and where the residuals ^ ￿i;t and ^ ￿
￿
i;t are obtained from the following regressions:
^ ei;t = ^ ￿i^ ei;t￿1 + ^ ￿i;t ^ ei;t = ^ ￿i^ ei;t￿1 +
Ki X
k=1
^ ￿i;k￿^ ei;t￿k + ^ ￿
￿
i;t
and ^ ei;t are the residuals from equation (17).
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests
Test statistic sit bit yit
tIPS -1.06 1.70 2.42
tBD￿rob -1.24 -0.30 -0.95
tMP￿a -0.49 -0.69 1.13
tMP￿b -0.40 -0.79 0.64
tCIPS -2.13 -1.70 -1.46
Note: tIPS is the group mean t-statistic proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), tBD￿rob
is the OLS robust t-statistic proposed by Breitung and Das (2005), tMP￿a and tMP￿b are
the t-statistics based on the factor model proposed by Moon and Perron (2004) and tCIPS
is the test proposed by Pesaran (2006). They all test the null of a unit root against the
alternative of stationarity. All tests are computed using one lag and they include individual
speci￿c constants and trends. The test statistics with ** reject the null of a unit root at the
5 percent level. For the tIPS, tBD￿rob, tMP￿a and tMP￿b tests, the null is rejected if t < ￿1:64
and for the tCIPS test, the null is rejected if tCIPS < ￿2:85:
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Table 2 : Residual Based Panel Cointegration Tests
Test Statistics sit and bit sit and yit
Group mean t (semi-parametric) -4.22** -4.54**
Group mean t (parametric) -4.53** -4.83**
Note: See the Appendix for details. The statistics are distributed standard normal. They
test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration. All the
tests include individual speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects and common time e⁄ects. The test statistics
with ** reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. The 5 percent critical value is -1.64.
Table 3 : System Based Panel Cointegration Tests
sit, bit, yit
q = 0 q = 1 q = 2 Cointegrating relations
Panel test 14.26** 7.77** 0.81 2
Note: The panel cointegration statistic tests the null hypothesis that there are q coin-
tegrating relationships against the alternative that there are 3 cointegrating relationships.
The test includes individual speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. The test statistics with ** reject the null
at 5 percent level. The panel test has a 5 percent critical value of 1.64. The moments used
for the panel test are tabulated in Shiamptanis (2008).
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Table 4 : Panel Estimates of the Cointegrating Parameters
r ’
coe¢ cients 0.0422** 0.0380**
standard errors (0.0061) (0.0076)
Note: r and ’ are the group-mean panel FMOLS estimates of real interest rate and target
surplus. The estimates are based on the Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West bandwidth
selection procedure. They include individual speci￿c e⁄ects. The ** indicate statistical
signi￿cance at the 5 percent level. The 5 percent critical value is 1.96.
Table 5 : Panel Estimates of the Fiscal Parameters
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿1 ￿2 ￿3
coe¢ cients 0.4911** -0.1186** 0.6277** 0.0607 -0.0911** 0.1888**
standard errors (0.0766) (0.0452) (0.0846) (0.0689) (0.0388) (0.0706)
Note: ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 are the group-mean panel estimates for the coe¢ cient on lagged
surplus, on target surplus and debt service, respectively. ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 are the group-mean
panel estimates for the coe¢ cients on the lagged change in surplus, the lagged change in debt
and the lagged change in output. The ** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent
level.
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Table 6 : Panel Estimates of the Fiscal Parameters Before and After Maastricht Treaty
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿1 ￿2 ￿3
Pre-Maastricht 0.3205** -0.0060 0.6855 0.0885 -0.1831** 0.1212
(0.1219) (1.3239) (1.2825) (0.1079) (0.0451) (0.0685)
Post-Maastricht 0.3186** -0.0501 0.7315 0.0909 -0.0521 0.3302**
(0.1425) (1.5249) (1.4951) (0.0935) (0.0759) (0.1318)
Note: The ** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
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